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Philosophy of Vipassani Meditation : Appreciating 
the Rationale Basis of the Insightful Meditation 
-Sonam Thakchoe­
[Sceptical modem scholarship has so far ignored the philosophical significance of 
ViJl"SsaniL Suspecting it as just another form of mystical religious practice, and therefore 
lacking any academic value, the academic world often consciously sleers dear of vipassanii.. 
In this paper however, I intend to make a bold claim that vipassanii has a solid philosophical 
and phenomenological foundation. So the aim of this paper is to demystifying!he viJl"SSani 
by showing the ways in wbich the principles of Yiprus8.lJi suppon my claim thai it hl!Ji " 
profound philosophical foundation. The paper is simply an in.illl1ioo to anyone, !he sceptics 
and the faithful alike, to consider the strengtbs and the weaknesses of the arguments 
presental here. The arguments in the paper unfold progressively, .. they are drawn upon 
the delineation and the discussion of some of the key concepts of the vipB1lSlll1ii. Beginning 
with Ibe epistemological argument of p8i1if. (insightful awareness), the paper defends ils 
claim, by way of exploring the phenomenological argument of vl'XillJlii (experience), the 
psychological argument of flI¢Ia (craving), the sOleriological argument of shaking off the 
ta!'hi (craving), Ihe epistemological argument of slHfIpajaiiiia (correctly and wholly 
understanding the reality), the methodological argument of satipal!hiina (foundations of 
mindfulness); and the paper concludes with some practical remarks on the significance of 
catching the moment as a way of applying vipassanii in daily tife.] 
Introduction 
Broadly speaking, there are two ways of cultivating mindfulness (bhBvanii). 
The first, called samatha-bhivlUli (often translated as 'calm abiding'), is 
oriented towards the cultivation of mental serenity, single-pointed attention, 
and mindfulness. TIlls fonn of meditation is said to sustain mental vigilance; 
anchoring its awareness on the reality of phenomenon as it is presented to it 
moment by moment. Overcoming mental agitation, distraction, drowsiness, 
stress, anxiety and so on, samatha-bhivana enhances a suslained clarity and 
concentration of the mind. VipasslUla, often translated as • special insight', 
'penetrating insight', 'insightful awareness', on the other hand, is IUl 
awareness of truths as they present themselves by way of penetrating into 
them, dissecting them and disintegrating them. Mutually complementing 
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each other, mental serenity provides a sustained mental stability while 
insightful meditation sustains mental awareness. Even as a preliminary 
requirement for the practice of vip8ssanii, iiniipiinasati « mindfulness of the 
breath is introduced (AniipiinaslI.ti Suua MN 118): Observing one's 
respiration (naturally as it comes in and as it goes out) quietens the mind, 
stills the discursive thoughts. strips away all accretions of memory (mental 
verbalisations and conceptualisations related to past experience and the 
future expectations) and allows the mind to stand back as an objective 
observer. Witnessing the arising and the passing away of all kinds of 
thoughts, memories and emotions, mind is able to stand solid like a rock 
undeterred, serene and composed. Coupled with mental serenity, insightful 
awareness of vipassanii is able to objectively engage with reality, letting 
reality present itself as it is, in any shape or form, without identifying with it 
or appropriating it. 
Vipassanii practice began some twenty five centuries ago, and is 
very much alive today. Budelhists have been practising it since its early 
days, and it is now appropriated in modern psychotherapy to treat various 
forms of mental disorders. Sceptical modern scholarship has so far ignored 
its philosophical significance. Suspecting it as just another form of mystical 
and religious dogma, and therefore lacking any academic value, the 
academic world often consciously steers clear of vipBssanii. The paper is 
simply an invitation to anyone, the sceptics and the faithful alike, to consider 
the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments presented here. The' 
arguments in the paper unfold progressively, as they are drawn upon the 
delineation and the discussion of the philosophical and the 
phenomenological bases of seven key claims made in vipassanii Beginning 
with the empirical and epistemological argument of paniia (insightful 
awareness); the paper, supports its claim, by way of exploring the 
phenomenological argument of vedanii (experience); the psychological 
argument of taJ;1hii (craving ): the soteriological argument of shaking off the 
tIf.!lhii (craving ); the epistemological argument of sarnpajaiiiia (correctly and 
wholly understanding the reality); the methodological argument of 
saripauhiina (foundations of mindfulness); and ihe paper concludes with 
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awareness of what things really are through vipassanii; that it means a total 
freedom from any conceptual and linguistic barrier. 
This second argument becomes clearer as the discussion focuses on 
the bhiivanii-maya paiiiiii. In the SaiJgiirava Sutta of the Ma.i.ihima Nikiiya 11: 
211 of the P~i canon. there is a reference made to three camps of thinkers: 
(i) the traditionalists (81lussavjkii), (ii) the rationalists and metaphysicians 
(takki vimlilpsi) and (iii) the experientialists. The Buddha says that he 
belongs to the third group. The rationale behind the Buddha's statement is 
made clearer in the Digha Nikiiya m where out of three forms of palina 
'knowledge'-suta-maya paliiiii (P; Skt. trllta-mayi prajiiii) 'heard­
knowledge', cintii-maya paiiiia (P; Stk. cintii-mllyi prajiiii) 'philosophic­
knowledge' and bhavanii-maya paiiiiii (P; Ski. bbiivanii-mayi prlljiiii) often 
translated as 'meditative awareness' or 'experiential awareness' or 'lived 
awareness' - the Buddha inculcates the third. Identifying himself amongst 
the experientialists, the Buddha recognises the third form of knowledge, the 
one that springs from the immediate personal experience of the truths as 
they really are, is more edifying, reliable, and effective, in contrast with the 
other two forms of knowledge whicb are theoretical, conceptual, and 
mediated. 
The BUddha's identification with experientialists, on the one hand, 
and his stress on the cultivation of vipassanii, on the other, are therefore 
closely linked. This is also an indication that the empirical sense of 
vipassanii and that of bbiivanii-mayii-paiiifii corresponds with each other. 
Both are bbiiv81las, because both cultivate the awareness of things as they 
really are, through which the paiiiiii, 'insightful awareness', is cultivated. 
2. The Epistemological Argument of Insightful Awareness 
(pa.Jfifi) 
The second argument is premised upon a thesis that vipassanii is, on the 
epistemological front, an insightful awareness (paiiiia) of how things really 
are (yathiibhiiturp iiiipadassanarp). In other words vjpassanii is seeing and 
penetrating through things' ultimate truth (panunattha sacca) in contrast with 
the naIve assumption based on reified reality of the conventionaVempirical 
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some practical remarks on the significance of catching the moment as way 
of applying the vipassanii in daily life. 
1. The Empirical Argument of VipssslI1li & Experiential 
Awareness (bbi'VlI1lii-msyii pdiIii) 
So let us begin with the first argument which goes as follows: that 
vipassanii (P; Skt. vipasyana) which means 'to see things in special ways' 
or 'in the correct way' (visesa), 'in different ways' (vividha.rp) ­
comprehends the nature of things personally, directly and immediately. This 
is because the experiential awareness of how things really are (bhavanii­
maya paiiiia) arises and unfolds entirely within the framework of one's own 
psychophysical aggregates. To understand this argument, we need to 
discuss etymology and the definition of the term' vipassana, ' and also the 
way in which vipassanii corresponds to lived awareness (bhiivsna-mayii 
panni). Etymologically, the root pas in the Pali term vipassana (P; SkI. 
vipasyani) means 'to see', and the particle vi means visesa 'in a special 
way'. Less literally it means, visesa 'in correct way', vividharp, 'in different 
ways' - comprehending the nature of things multi-dimensionally. The word 
vipassanii comes to communicate the sense of seeing things 'as they really 
are" 'in a special way', more appropriately, 'in the correct way', 'from 
different angles'. Defining the term vipassanii the A!#Iasiilini stresses the 
latter sense, hence, it reads: 'vipassanii is seeing things from the different 
angles as impermanent.' (124-134)1 The Visuddhimagga-mahapkii, on the 
other hand, defines' vipassanii as seeing [things] in special ways' (2.427)? 
'Special way' in the sense that the way in which vipassanii sees things is 
radically different from the commonsense perspective of reality. (We will 
develop this argument more fully later.) What is crucial 10 notice in terms of 
the orientation of vipassanii is a twofold arguments: first, that it is always 
Wlmediated, because vipassana sees things immediately, directly; second, 
that it is always non-conceptual, therefore non-linguistic, given the naked 
1, anixidivBSen8 vividhena iikiirena passaa ri .ipassBIJiiI 
2. vi=./o passati ri vipassBIJa / 
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truth (sammuti or vohiira-sacca). This must foUow because from the 
standpoint of vipassllllii, things are seen as dependently co-arisen (paricca­
samupaiiiiha), impermanent (Illlicca), selfless (anattii) and empty (suiiiia). 
Etymologically patifiii is derived from the root fiii which means 'to 
know', 'to be aware', prefixed by pa meaning 'correctly'. The literal English 
equivalence of the word patifiii is therefore 'to know correctly', 'awareness 
of thing's true nature'. Commonly used English terms such as 'insight', 
'knowledge" 'wisdom" and 'awareness', as we can see, convey the aspects 
of patina, while none of these terms adequately corresponds to the original 
Piqi term. Recognising this limitation, I have consistently used' insightful 
awareness' to translate paiiiiii. Even then, 'insightful awareness' should not 
be taken as its equivalent. Taking any English word as equivalent to the 
original term paiiiiii clearly does injustice, in panicular, to expressing the 
subtle nuances, and the multi-dimensional character associated with the 
word pafiiiii. 
The traditional Pii.!i texts offer a couple of insightful definitions of 
the term patiiiii. First, it is defined as yathiibhiiturp iiiipadassanarp, which 
means 'to see things as they really are'. This definition contradistinguishes 
patinii from the ordinary knowledge of things. While the latter is based on 
the impression or the perception of the apparent mode of things, pafifiii 
instead is a direct vision of the true nature of the I.hings-or the ultimate 
mode of being of things. While panfiii critically penetrates into the 
paramattha sacca (P; SkI. paramiirtha satya), 'ultimate truth' for it is the 
insightful awareness of the penetrating and interlocking nature of all the 
things. Ordinary knowledge, on the other hand, is premised upon the 
assumption of reality of the sammuti or vohiira sacca (P; SkI. sarpvrti or 
vyvahiira satya) 'conventional', or 'empirical truth' since it is firmly fixed 
upon the knowing of the conventional aspects or the apparent modes of 
things. 
The second definition of pannii says. pakarera jiiniiti' ti paiiiiii, 
'because it sees [things] from different dimensions, it is patiiiii'. Unlike 
ordinary knowledge which is often only one dimensional, pafinii is multi­
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dimensional in its perspective. in that it sees things from various angles, on 
various levels of subtleties. This definition is qualified by two arguments, 
both based on the two perspective. of the same paii~ii. First. when paiiiiii 
sees the things synthetically, i.e., non-analytically, it mows things from the 
macro perspective. holistically and constructively, because from this 
dimension of paiiiiii, things are seen as the papcca-samuppanna (P; SkI. 
pratitya-samutpanna) 'dependently co-arisen' - in that they are loci of mter­
relational processes, a matrix of inter-related phenomena, subjected to the 
constant becoming. Second, when paiifiii engages with the world 
analytically, it sees things from the micro level, minutely and 
deconstructively, because from this micro-dimension paiiiiiiis directly aware 
of thing's subtle realities of being anicca (P; Skt. anitya), in 'constant flux'. 
'ever-changing' and 'ever-becoming'; analta (P; Skt. an-iitman). 'not-self'­
coreless personality or the lacking of an abiding spirit; and tiinya (P; Skt. 
siinya) 'empty' - devoid of any determinate underlying substance or 
essence. Both the perspectives of paiiiiii, and therefore both the arguments 
demonstrate a radical departure ofpaiiiiii from the commonsense view of the 
world wherein, phenomenologically speaking. things are viewed as having 
inherently enduring substances, an essential core, and the people possessing 
the abiding spirits, identities, or selves enduring through the time and the 
space. 
The two arguments premised upon the two perspectives of paiiiiii are 
however not contradictory with one another. Rather they are complementary 
dimensions ofpaiiiiii, as both are coextensive and mutually entail each other, 
as both function in mutually supportive ways in establishing the lack of 
essence or any determinate core in everything there is. The contrasting factor 
between the two arguments is this. To argue that paiifiii sees things 
macroscopically, is to argue it sees them c~nstructively, interconnectedly 
and dependently co-arisenly, whereas to argue that paiiiia sees things 
microscopically, is to argue that it visions them deconstructively, minutely, 
piercingly, penetratingly. This must follow because while explicitly 
stressing the constructive approach or its positive mode of seeing things, the' 
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argument implicitly establishes the deconstructive mode of engagement of 
pafiiiii. Explicitly stressing paiiiiii's deconstructive mode of engagement, the 
ar3ument implicitly establishes its constructive mode of engagement. A 
cr1Jcial textual support to this argument comes from the Srupyutta Nikiiya, 
where the Buddha offers the explanation of the way in which panna. 
operates in the four noble truths: 'Bhikkhu, he who sees suffering sees also 
the origin of suffering, sees also the cessation of suffering, sees also the 
way leading to the cessation of suffering' (5.437)1. The significance of the 
Buddha's statements is illustrated in the Visuddhirnagga of Buddhagosa 
with the hell) of a simile: as the lamp bums the wick, so paiina. fully 
understands suffering, as the lamp dispels the darkness, so paiiiiii abandons 
the origin of suffering, as the lamp makes the light appear, so patiiiii 
develops the path, as the lamp uses up the oil. so paiiiiii realises cessation 
which brings' end to the defilements cNiJ;Iamoli, 2001: 809). 
So the conclusion from the epistemological arguments is this: 
whether paiiiiii sees things as dependently arisen or it sees them as empty, it 
essentially does not deviate from seeing how things really are, the central 
preoccupation of vipassanii. 
3. The Phenomenological Argument of Vedani 'Experience' 
So the question at issue here is how does the vipassanii give rise to the 
bhiivanii-mayii paiiiiii? The answer to this question comes from the 
phenomenological argument of vedanii which states: that the vedanii 
(experience constituting the entire physical sensation and 
psychological/emotional feelings) is the phenomenological foundation for 
the cultivation of vipassanii, for it is fundamentally centred in awakening the 
phenomenological structure of experience although this is achieved by way 
of appropriating the vcdanii itself. This must follow because of an intimate 
connection between the mind and vedanii such that every mental thought 
results in physical/emotional vedanii. 
Let us take some time to understand this argument. At the heart of 
the argument is the role of I'cdanii and the way in which vipassanii 
1. Yo bhikkh.ve ...... dukkhanirodam pi pass.1i Ii. 
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appropriates vedana. The term vedana, loosely translated as 'sensations' or 
'feeling' covers the entire range of physical and mental experiences, 
therefore I prefer to use the term 'experience' in order to encompass its 
scope of vedanii. Vedanii is defined in terms of fulfilling three criteria: first 
yii vedayatf ti vedana, 'that which feels the object is vedana', second, sa 
vedayitaJakkha.J)a, 'its characteristic is to experience', and third, 
anubhavanar8sii, 'its function is to realise the object' (Buddhagosa, 
Visuddhimagga:lOl). Drawing upon this definition, vedaniiis the medium 
through which the truths about sensory objects are experienced, physically, 
emotionally or psychologically. 
Concerning the relationship between the mind and the vedanii, in the 
Angurtar3 Nikiiya, the Buddha issues one of his famous injunctions: 
ved3nasamosar~ii sabbe dhamma 'everything that arises in the mind 
(dhamma) flows through the bodily sensations' (3.10.58). This passage is 
profoundly significant in understanding the argument at stake here, for it 
cuts through the practical and the philosophical underpinnings of vipassanii 
as it dissolves the problematic subject-object, (niima 'mind'/riipa 'matter') 
dichotomy, and establishes the ground for understanding them as closely 
inter-related phenomena. The niima consists of cilta, 'consciousnesses' and 
dhammas, 'mental concomitants' arising in the eilta, whereas riipa consists 
of kaya, 'physical body' and vedanii 'sensation' arising on the kaya. 
Two premises underlie the principle in the Buddha's injunction. 
Both the premises defend the thesis of an undivided unity that exists 
between mind and matter and vedanii is that which brings the two together. 
First, and indeed the more explicit one is this: that all dhammas - namely, 
thoughts and emotions - that arise in the mind quickly change into matter as 
bodily vedanii, 'bodily sensation' because whatever arises in the ~ind, say 
anger, ill-will, hatred, instantly culminates in unpleasant bodily sensations. 
Whereas the consciousness saturated by love, benevolence, and goodwill 
instantly culminates in pleasant bodily sensations. Also crucial to 
understand what is at stake in the first premise is the second premise implicit 
in the Buddha's injunction, which states as follows: Just as the mind 
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transforms into matter (although predominantly into mental states), so the 
matter transforms into the mind (although predominantly into material 
phenomenon), because the vedanii flowing on the body triggers the mental 
dhammas of thoughts and emotional responses. This must follow because 
as a response to the pleasant bodily sensation, craving and clinging arise, as 
a reaction against the unpleasant bodily sensation, aversion, anger, hatred 
and ill-will arise, and as a response to the neutral bodily sensation, 
ignorance and indifference arise. 
Underpinning both the premises is the idea the Buddha expresses in 
the A{Jguttara Nikiiya, which states: 'within every dhamma vedanii is 
present' (AN ill 10.58). What this means is that dhammas of thoughts and 
emotions arise in the mind as result of the reactions against the vedanii 
flowing on the body. Vedanii on the body, on the other hand, arises due to 
the response to the dhammas, psychological/emotional vedaniis in the mind. 
Whether it is the bodily vedanii giving rise to the mental vedanii or the 
mental vedanii giving rise to the bodily vedanii, in either case the presence of 
vedanii is the key. Based on this principle vipassanii employs the bodily 
vedanii as an instrument in its pathway to transform the dhammas of anger, 
of attachment ancl of ignorance in the mind. The application of vedanii to this 
end also follows from the arguments discussed earlier: that it is through the 
vedanii as a medium the sensory objects are experienced and that it is 
through the medium of vedinii alone that the pailiiii, 'insightful awareness' 
of IInicca 'impermanence', dukkha 'suffering', and analtli 'not-selr and 
siinyaCii 'emptiness' is developed. 
Seeing the centrality of vedanii, in the Arlguttara Nikiiya, the Buddha 
goes even further: 'To one who exreriences vedanii, monks, I teach the truth 
of suffering, I leach the truth of the arising of suffering, I teach the truth of 
the cessation of suffering" and I teach the truth of the path leading to the 
cessation of suffering' (AN 1.3.62).1 There are four premises supporting 
--~------
1" vediyamii.nass. kho pMJiiharp bhikkhave. idarp dukkharp Ii plliiiiiipemi. aYaJ!l dukkhB­
saIlIudayo Ii plliiiiiipemi ayarp dukkhB-nirodho Ii plliiiiiipemi. ayarp dukkha-nirodha­
giimini-pa!ipad5 Iip:liiii!ipemi / 
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the Buddha's claim: first, that the vedanii is the basis through which one 
develops a correct realisation of the truth of suffering - suffering of 
suffering, suffering of change and pervasive and conditioned suffering ­
because such realisation requires directly experiencing the unpleasant 
vedaniis of suffering, physically, emotionally and psychologically. Second, 
that vedanii is the phenomenological basis through which one abandons the 
truth of arising of suffering - karma, afflicted thoughts and emotions ­
because such abandonment requires experiencing, through the medium of 
vedana, the way in which the afflictive emotions, thoughts and karma result 
in suffering. Third, that vedanii is the phenomenological basis through 
which one attains freedom from or cessation of the suffering - nirv~a and 
buddhahood - because the freedom from suffering is the freedom from the 
truth of arising of suffering at the level of physicallemotionallpsychological 
vedanii. Finally, that vedanii is the phenomenological, basis through which 
one develops the truth of path leading to the cessation of suffering - the 
eightfold noble path - because these paths are progressively internally 
experienced through the vedanii within oneself guided by right 
understanding. 
All the premises presented above definitively demonstrate that 
vedanii is the phenomenological instrument through which one develops 
paiiiiii, insightful awareness of the four noble truths and the other relevant 
insights that emerge from it. This conclusion must follow from the fact that 
vedanii constitutes the entirety of our experience, and that vedanii is 
instrumental in order to develop a direct awareness of truths (suffering, 
origin, cessation and path). It therefore makes perfect sense that the Buddha 
teaches vipassanii only to those who can experience the vedanii, after all 
paiiiiii, an insightful awareness, can only emerge with the experience of 
vecianii as its phenomenological basis. 
4. The Psychological Argument of Vedani (Experience) & 
TlI{Ibi (Craving) 
Vedanii is, as argued above, the locus of developing vjpassanii. because the 
latter is founded upon the panna, insightful awareness of vedanii. It is 
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important to bear in the mind that vedanii - experience of physical 
sensations, emotional/psychological feelings - however is not in itself 
constitutive of the paiifiii despite it providing the basis for the arising of 
paiiiiii, for the latter depends on the direct awareness of the former. This 
follows' because the same vedanii can also be the basis from which the 
arising of avijjii 'ignorance', 'confusion' - the antithesis of paiifiii - occurs. 
To clarify: a correct understanding of the nature of vedanii. constitutes pafiiiii, 
hence, vipassanii employs vedanii as a means to realise nibbiina (P; SkI. 
nirviil)a) 'ultimate freedom', the failure to realise the true characteristics of 
vedanii however, constitutes a bondage in the saI!lsiiric suffering as it leads 
to the arising of /lJ!lhii 'craving', to upiidiina 'clinging' and to bhava 
'becoming'. To be sure, depending on the response to vedanii, !be latter 
either becomes a vehicle to saJ'!'Isiiric bondage or to nibbiinic freedom. This 
distinction in the uses of vedanii, so vital in the philosophy and the practice 
of vipassanii, takes us into the next major argument. 
Vedanii is the phenomenological basis for the arising of the 
psychological/emotional conditioning of ca{lhii on three grounds: that ca{lhii 
of craving arises in response to the pleasant experience; that ca{lhii of 
aversion arises in response to the unpleasant experience: and that llJ!lhii of 
ignorance arises in response to the neutral experience. These must follow 
because tll{lhii arises in response to vedanii - physical/emotional/ 
psychological experiences - as the result of the contact between the senses 
and the sensory objects. and that vedanii is the crucial link between desire 
and the object of desire upon which it is fIxated. 
What this argument points to is the eldstence of an invariable link 
between vedanii and llJ!lhii (P; Skt. 1J~!lii) 'craving • - conditioned by the 
defIlements of craving, aversion, ignorance, inner drives. thirsts - to reach 
out for the pleasant experience. or the urge to repel the unpleasant 
experience, or simply to ignore the indifferent experience, because t8{lhii 
arises in response to the type of vedanii, TlJ{lhii consists of the psychological 
and emotional fixation through craving. aversion and ignorance, where as 
vedanii is the crucial link between craving and the objects of craving, 
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aversion and the objects of aversion, indifference and the objects af 
indifference. This argument also explains the reason behind the central 
preoccupation of vipassanii, namely, to develop a heightened awareness of 
vedanii (especially bodily sensations) free from any reaction to it 
whatsoever, for only such awareness of vedanii has the capacity to eradicate 
the fixation of t<lflhii. 
While the commonsense assumption is that craving arises 
exclusively from sensory objects, which is to say that sense objects 
themselves lead to the arising of craving (saJiiyacanapaccayii tli(lhii), the 
philosophy of vipBssanii however argues differently. It maintains that 
vedanii is the vital link between the senses and the sensory objects, and 
therefore, argues that sense objects lead to the arising of vedan ii 
(sa!iiyatanapaccayii vedaniiJ, and vedanii in tum leads to the arising of 
craving (vedanii paccayii talJhii). Three premises support the thesis that 
vedanii is the missing link between the sense objects and the rli(lhii. Tli(lhii 
arises at the level of vedanii because it is either conditioned by craving that 
arises in response to the pleasant vedanii (pleasant sensations/feelings 
immediately flowing on one's body and in the mind but not from the 
pleasant objects themselves); or it is conditioned by aversion that arises in 
response to the unpleasant vedanii (unpleasant sensations/feelings 
immediately flowing on one's body and in the mind but not from the 
unpleasant objects); or conditioned by ignorance that arises in response to 
the neutral vedanii (neutral sensations/feelings flowing immediately on one's 
body and in the mind, not from the neutral objects themselves). 
All three premises point to the effect that the root of the human 
problems is the mental conditioning or the fixation of tli(lhii (inruitive and 
instinctive drives), and that it is deeply seeded in vedanii. Therefore cBIJhii 
must be addressed or eradicated at the level of vedanii. Consider an alcoholic 
and a drug addict. An alcoholic knows, at least on the intellectual front, 
perhaps even on the physical level, that too much consumption of alcohol is 
ruining his life - the loss of wealth and health. A drug addict also knows 
very well that his habit of abusing drugs is gradually abusing himself. In 
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spite ?f having the intellectual knowledge of the harmful nature of their 
habits, both the alcoholic and the drug addict continue the abusive life-styles 
nevertheless, The question is "why?" For the Buddha, the answer is simple. 
While the addiction occurs at the level of bodily vedani as a reaction to the 
apparent bodily pleasantness, the knowledge about the harmful affects of the 
addiction is only an intellectual one, and does not arise from the level of 
experience. Freedom from the deep seated addiction however must arise, 
according to the vipassanii tradition, from the actual experiential insight, 
therefore from the realisation of truth at the level of vedanii, experience, 
rather than mere intellectual understanding. 
The realisation of truth at the level of vedanii is precisely the entire 
focus of the function of viplissanii. The reason is as follows: The addictive 
nature of tll.{lhii ceases to arise with the cessation of the reaction against 
vedanii, as it is the latter that fuels the former. The reaction against the 
vedanii ceases with the arising of equanimity, an objective awareness of 
characteristics of vedanii. realising it in constant flux - vision of it as arising 
(samudaYIl-dhamma-linupassf) and vision of it as ceasing (vaya-dhamma­
anupassi). Observing all forms of vedanii with the vision of equanimity, 
vipassanii stops the arising of tli{lhii at the level of bodily and emotional 
experience since vipassanii stops feeding lli{lhii by reacting against vedanii 
bodily and mentally. This must follow because vipassanii is the cultivation 
of awareness of equanimity with respect to all forms of vedanii, both 
physical and mental. 
It is clear then thai the way in which vipassanii responds to vedanii is 
in having neither one with tll.{lhii of craving for pleasant experience nor one 
with ta{lhii of aversion for unpleasant experience nor with ta!,hii of 
indifference to neulral experience. Rather the response of vipassanii entails 
an attentive awareness with equanimity. knowing objectively, vedanii as the 
process of arising and passing away (uppadavllya dhammino), of the 
transient (anicca), of the stressful (dukkhll), of the selfless (anatt§). When 
the arising of la.!fha SlOpS through the practice of viplIssanii, only then dawns 
Ihe freedom from the addictive nature of tll.{lhii with respecl 10 all forms of 
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experiences of vedanii. The Buddha, in the Brahmajiila Sutta, supports this 
argument when he proclaims: 'Having experienced as they really are, the 
arising of sensations, their passing away, the relishing in them, the danger in 
them, the release from them, the enlightened one, 0 monks, has become free 
without grasping' (ON 1.36).1 
The conclusion of the psychological argument is that the problem of 
the addictive fixation of tiJ!lhii for anything - including obsession to drugs, 
alcohol, junk food, or any other sense object - must be addressed at the level 
of sensation. GiVen the vipassanii claims to attend to the problem of the 
addictive fixation of til1Jhii at the level of vedanii, experience, we will find 
out: How does it do it? The answer to this question comes from the 
argument related to the inner workings of vipassanii, to be more precise, the 
soteriological argument pertaining to the way in which vipassanii shaJces off 
the fixation of t~ii for the pleasant, the unpleasant, and the neutral 
vedaniis. 
5. The Soteriological Argument of Vedani (Experience) & 
Ta.pbi (Craving ) 
As argued earlier, the problem of suffering is deeply rooted in til{lhii, and 
t~ii in turn is seeded in vedanii. TiJ!Ihii of craving arises due to the thirst 
for the pleasant experience, tiJ!lhii of aversion arises in reaction against the 
unpleasant experience, and tiJ!lhii of ignorance arises due to the indifferent 
attitude towards the neutral experience. Strictly speaJcing, suffering arises 
with the arising of til1Jhii, and there is no temporal sequence between the 
two. Suffering is inevitable so long as til1Jhii persists, since the latter is the 
former. From this it follows that the freedom from suffering means the 
eradication of tiJ!lhii - releasing oneself from the fixated addiction of 
cravings at the level of vedanii. The process of release, according to the 
vipassanii tradition, occurs at the level of vedanii, direct experience. What 
this means is that no amount of intellectual exercises, devotional practices, 
or emotional reactions against the deeply seeded conditioning of tiJ!lhii, it is 
1. VedananalJl samudayatrca attharigamaiica assadaiica idlnavaiicB nissBra.{Janca 
yalhabhiiUUp viruM. anupada-vimuNO, bhikkhav~ Lathiigato. 
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argued, could release oneself from the suffering because none of these 
attends to the rool of tllflhii - that is, none of these superficial responses 
sever l4fIhii at the level of vedll1lii. 
So we tum to the next argument. The thesis is that vedll1lii is the 
pathway through which vipassanii achieves the psychological/emotional 
freedom from the conditioning of taJ)hii and it is corroborated by threefold 
premises: 
* 	 first, addiction to taJ)h8 of craving to pleasant experience (vedll1lii) is 
eradicated by means of employing !he pleasant experience because 
the addiction of craving (taJ)bii) arises in response 10 the pleasant 
vedll1la; 
second, addiction to taJ)hii of aversion to unpleasant experience 
'" (yedanii) is eliminated by the means of !he unpleasant experience 
because it arises in response to the unpleasant experience; and 
* 	 third, addiction to taJ)hii of ignorance to neutral experience is 
eradicated by the means of the neutral experience because it arise in 
response to !he neutral experience, 
The argument takes into account the way in which taJ)bii arises in response 
to vedanii - physical/emotional/psychological experiences - as a result of the 
contact between !he senses and the sensory objects, and therefore vedanii is 
the crucial link between the sensory objects and !he senses. The three 
premises are drawn from three different expressions of taJ)bii (of craving, of 
aversion and of ignorance), and three approaches to eradicating taphii (three 
modes of employing the vedanii in !he vipassanii). Let us tum to the trio one 
at a time: 
5.1. Appropriating tbe Unpleasant Experience 
The first of the trio is the premise concerned with the means to be 
appropriated in eradicating taJ)bii of aversion towards the unpleasant vedanii. 
The argument comes from the SaJ'[Iyuaa Nikiiya., which reads: 'Eradicate the 
latent tendency of aversion using unpleasant sensation', it says (SN 
2.4.251).] Putting the point differently, an unpleasant vedana itself is 
1. 	 dukkhiiya. vcdaniiya papghiinusayo pallalabOOI 
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employed as the means 10 eradicate taIJhii of aversion towards the unpleasant 
vedanii because aversion to an unpleasant experience arises in response to 
the unpleasant vedanii flowing either on ones body or in one's mind. In the 
Naku/apitusutta of the SBIpyutta Nikiiya, we read an incident occurrW in the 
Buddha's lifetime. That incident clarifies the idea of appropriating the 
painful bodily sensation as a tool for eradicating the mental aversion. It is 
said that Nakulapita and his wife loved the Buddha dearly like their own 
son, and they regularly went to see him. As Nakula grew old, his health did 
not permit him to see the Buddha as he would have liked. When the Buddha 
saw him sad and depressed as the consequence, the Buddha offered this 
advice: . Dayaka! This body is always overwhelmed by diseases; it is just 
like an easily breakable egg. As it is covered with a thin layer of skin, it is 
always subject to outward dangers. Diiyaka! It is nothing but foolish when a 
person says about this-"I am really healthy". Diiyaka, you have to Irain 
yourself like this-'Though my body has pain, I will leave my mind unhurt' 
(SN 2.2 [VRI 2.3.1]) 
Here are the reasons behind the Buddha's advice: While facing some 
form of physical pain is an inevitable fact of life, mental suffering is not. 
Physical suffering associated with illness, aging and death, it is argued, does 
not necessarily lead to mental strife, depending on the response to physical 
pain, it can become a vehicle to attaining nirviiJ:la. If the response to physical 
pain is one of a conditioned reaction with r31}hii of aversion, the 
consequence is naturally emotional and psychological strife, because of the 
causal connection between the two. Whereas if the response to physical pain 
is one of understanding with an insightful awareness, free from the habit of 
conditioned reaction of farhii. naturally the consequence is emotional and 
psychological joy and freedom, because of the causal connection between 
the two. In contrast to mental dhammas which necessarily transform 
themselves into the bodily vedaniis, as argued earlier, bodily vedanii does 
not mechanically Iransform itself into the mental dhamma. An unpleasant 
bodily vedanii only leads to the arising of mental agony in the presence of 
the reactions against vedana. The implication behind the Buddha's advice to 
Nakula is, in spite of the fact that one is afflicted by physical pain, one does 
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not necessarily undergo mental agony as a result. Should physical pain itself 
be appropri ated as a means of stopping the conditioned reaction of rapha to 
the painful physical experience, the arising of mental agony ceases. 
Therefore one is released from the psychological aversion and mental strife 
associated with it. In this way the practice of vipassanii protects the mind 
from being hurt by one's physical illness, and this is the essence of the 
Buddha's message to Nakula. 
To understand the premise at issue, the distinction drawn between 
physical pain and mental agony needs to become clearer. And to understand 
fully the implication of physical pain being appropriated as a means to 
eradicate the mental agony, we tum to the Buddha's definitions of dukkha. 
('bodily pain') and domanassa ('mental agony'). In the Digha Nikaya, the 
Buddha describes dukkha, 'bodily pain' in the following terms: 'What now, 
o monks, is pain? If there is, 0 monks, any kind of bodily pain, any kind of 
bodily unpleasantness or any kind of painful or unpleasant sensation as a 
result of bodily contact-this, 0 monks. is called pain' (DN 2.393).1 
Characteristicaliy, dukkha is any bodily unpleasant sensation. Causally, 
dukkha arises due to the bodily contact with its corresponding objects. A 
contact between the body and the' external objects results in the physical 
pain, that is, whether or not there is no mental reaction involVed. In contrast, 
a contact between the bodily pain and the mind (that is, mental reaction to 
the physical pain) results in both the bodily and the mental pain because of 
the presence of the mental response to the painful bodily sensation. In this 
respect, bodily pain should not be taken as purely physical. In the presence 
of the mental consciousness, any type of ved/lJlii must be felt or experienced, 
either bodily, or mentally, or both bodily and mentally. The body alone 
cannot make any sense of vedanii, so if there is no concept of pain, there is 
neither the pleasure nor the neutral in isolation of the mental function. 
I. 	 KalamaiicB. bhikkhave. dukkhlU)'l? YIU)'I kho. bhikkhavc. kiiyiklU)'l dukkhlU)'l kiiyika!!' 
asillU)'l kiiya"amphassajJJJp dukkhJJJp asiilJJJp vedayitJJJp. idJJJp vuccali. bhikkhave. 
dukkhlU)'l/ 
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How is physical pain, dukkha different from domanassa, mental 
agony? On the latter, the Buddha has this to say: 'What now, 0 monks, is 
agony? If there is, 0 monks, any kind of mental pain, any kind of mental 
unpleasantness or any kind of painful or unpleasant fecling as a result of 
mental contact--this, 0 monks, is called agony'(DN 2.394).1 Domanassa is 
literally translated as 'mental agony'. In a stricter sense, it is characterised as 
emotional/psychological grief', emotional/psychological unpleasant 
experience, or what is termed simply as 'unpleasant inner feelings'. 
Causally, domanassa is produced from the mental contact with the mental 
objects such as ideas, beliefs, desires, fears, anger or reaction against the 
external objects. 
Of domanassa, 'mental agony' and of dllkkha 'bodily pain', the 
latter is appropriated as a pathway to eradicate the former. There are couple 
of reasons for this. First, from a practical point of view, the physical vedanii 
of pain is a more tangible experience and more suited to the development of 
the insightful awareness and equanimity compared to the mental vedanii of 
agony which is more fluid and abstract Second, because mental agony is 
triggered by reacting against the physical pain, a non-reactive awareness of 
the physical pain gradually weakens the mental agony, and eventually, 
eliminates it entirely. So dukkha, 'physical pain' is employed as an 
instrument to eradicate t~ii of aversion, to shake off domanassa, 'mental 
agony' that arises from the unpleasant bodily vedanii. 
Let us have a closer look at how this works in vipassanii: Ordinarily 
the mind is conditioned to react against anything that is physically 
unpleasant. Therefore typical response to the flow of painful experience on 
the body is one with the t~ii of aversion. Constituted by four interrelated 
activities, this response: first exaggerates the physical pain as something 
unbearable; second robs of mental composure, equanimity and objectivity; 
third gives rise to mental agitation, agony and stress; and finally, compels 
1. 	 kalamailcB bhikkhave, domanliAssrp? Y"'I' kilo, bhikkhBve, celBsik"'l' dukkharp 
celasikfll!1 BSilfll!1 mwosamphsssBjsrp dukkhsrp ass/srp vedByil"'l', id"'l' vucCBti, 
bhikkhavc, domanBSSDlp. 
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the mind (0 identify itself with the mental agony - now it thinks, 'I am in the 
pain', 'r am sick', 'J am this', and 'I am that'. These are the ways in which 
t8.{lhii of aversion, reacting against the physical unpleasant experience, 
conditions the mind into producing more psychological agony. The task of 
vipassanii is to decondition the habitual pattern of tII{lhii of aversion - to stop 
t8.{lhii of aversion from habitually feeding itself on the vicious cycles of 
negative thoughts produced from reacting against the unpleasant physical 
experience. Instead the response of vipassanii is to develop an objective 
awareness of the physical pain as it is. In so doing, an insightful awareness 
of the underlying characteristics of the physical pain come to the fore. That 
is, an awareness of even the most painful sensation as subjected 10 the law 
of flux - constantly becoming and constantly passing away - and that 
physical pain is essentially a locus of empty process, utterly lacking any 
substance or core. Understanding the pain in this way undermines the 
conditioned habit of the mind to react with the tII{lhii of aversion, and thus 
allows the unfolding of the inner composure, mindfulness and objective 
observation. Stilled awareness, freed from the habitual conditioning of 
reaction, released from the ensnares of tlll)hii, progressively heals the mental 
stress and agony - the body might be plagued by the physical pain, but the 
mind is able to retain sustained serenity and insightful awareness. 
In this way a proper practice of vipassanii prevents dukkha 'physical 
pain' from becoming a domanass 'mental' and 'psychological problem' - a 
painful physical sensation is now left confined to the physical domain, and it 
no longer feeds into a psychological reaction. A gradual progression on the 
path of vipassanii steadily weakens the conditioned, habitual reactive mind, 
ta!lhii of aversion, and consequently attains a gradual release from the 
domanassa, 'mental agony' by means of appropriating the physical dukkhs. 
5.2. Appropriating the Pleasant Experience 
The second premise, on the other hand, is concerned with the eradication of 
tII{lhii of craving for the pleasant vedanii. Again this premise comes from the 
Sarpyutta Nikiiya's passage which reads: 'Eradicate the latent tendency of 
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craving through the pleasant sensations' (SN 2.3.251 ).1 The Paphiina also 
states: 'Dependent on the pleasant bodily sensations ... vipassanii arises ... 
Path arises ... Knowledge arises .. , attainment of [ni bbana] arises' 
(1.1.423).2 Both the texts suggest the appropriation of pleasant vedanii as 
means to come out from tll{lhii of craving for the pleasant vedanii. So the 
argument goes like this: that pleasant vedanii itself is employed as the means 
to eradicate £Il{lhii of craving towards the pleasant vedanii because the origin 
of craving is a pleasant experience, as it arises in response to the pleasant 
vedanii flowing either in ones body or in ones mind. 
The issue here is: how is the pleasant bodily experience employed as 
a vehicle to eradicate tll{lhii of craving towards the pleasant sensation? To 
answer this question, and therefore to explain the argument, it is helpful to 
draw upon the distinction the Buddha makes between sukkha 'pleasant 
bodily sensations' and somanassa 'pleasant mental feelings' in the Digha 
Nikiiya. The Buddha defines sukkha as any kind of bodily pleasure, any 
kind of bodily pleasantness or any kind of pleasurable or pleasant feeling as 
a result of bodily contact. Whereas somanassa, according to this defmition, 
is any kind of mental joy, any kind of mental pleasantness or any kind of 
joyful or pleasant feeling as a result of mental contact. Of the two, sukkha is 
bodily, whereas somanassa is psychological/emotional. 
Ordinarily the mind is conditioned to react to anything that is 
sukkha, physically pleasant. A typical response to the flow of pleasant 
experience on the body is with tll{lhii of craving, clinging and grasping. 
Constituted by four interrelated activities pertaining to tIl{lhii of craving, this 
response: first, exaggerates the nature of physical pleasantness; second, 
yields to the attachment or clinging to the pleasure causing mental unbalance 
and disturbing its inner composure, equanimity and objectivity; third, 
produces mental stress and frustration as a consequence of reaching out for 
I. 	 sukhiiya, bbikkha>,e. ve<lanBYB rig. anusayo pabatabba .• 
2. 	 Pakatiip1l1lissByo-lcayiiaup sukhlJJ'!l upSllissaya . ... >'ipass81l1JJ'!l uppadeti. m.gglJJ'!l 
upp8deri. BbhiiliilJJ'!l uppiiIleti. sam§paItirp uppadcti. 
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the illusive pleasure; finally, conditions the mind to naively assume the 
sense of substance-self identifying oneself with the physical pleasure - '1 am 
happy', 'I want happiness'. In this manner, the fixation of tll{lhii transforms 
the physical pleasantness into a psychological conditioning. So the primary 
task of vipllsslinii is to mindfully deconstruct this habitual pattern of the 
mind, and free the mind from this fixated conditioning. Consequently. the 
mind, instead of reacting against the pleasant bodily sensation with f.I!{Ihii of 
craving, clinging and grasping, it develops an insightful awareness of the 
true characteristics of the pleasant bodily experience as its response. In so 
doing. even the most blissful bodily sensation is now seen as subjected to 
the law of fIux-constantly becoming and constantly passing away, 
essentially lacking any substance or core. Realising the pleasant bodily 
experience in the way it is described, vipassllflii releases the mind from its 
conditioned habit of reacting with the tal)hii of craving, thus sustaining 
mental calmness and composure, mindfulness and objective awareness. 
A stilled mind unaffected by the habitual conditioning of craving, 
clinging, grasping. is progressively released from the snares of tll{lhii, and 
therefore relieves itself from the mental stress and frustration fuelled by 
unfulfilled desires. The insightful awareness cultivated through the 
vipassanii. in this way, prevents sUkkha 'physical bliss' becoming a 
domllflllssa 'mental/psychological grief. Blissful physical sensation is left 
confined to a physical limit without allowing it to fuel the psychological 
wanL Progressively viplissllflii weakens the fixation of ttl{lhii, so there is a 
gradual emergence of the freedom from the domanass, mental agony, 
frustration, upsets, yearnings. As ttl{lhii of craving for pleasant experience 
steadily weakens, simultaneously, there is a steady growth of somanassa 
'inner joy', 'contentment', 'peace' and 'tranqUillity. This implies thai the 
ralionale behind .the vipassanii's appropriation of sukkha as a pathway to 
eradicate the taI)hii of craving, clinging and grasping for the pleasant vedanii 
must not be construed as a way of getting rid of the pleasant experiences, it 
simply is not the case. On the contrary the more one eradicates the tll{lhii of 
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craving the more profound and blissful one's experience of joy and 
satisfaction become. 
5.3. Appropriating the Neutral Experience 
Finally, the third premise is concerned with the eradication of t1i!lhii of 
ignorance towards neither pleasant nor unpleasant sensation (adukkham­
asukhii vedanii) which states: that neutral vedanii is appropriated as the 
means to eradicate ignorance or indifferent attitude towards the neutral 
experience. This is tenable because of the causal relationship between the 
two - the fact that ignorance arises from the neutral experience is the result 
of t1i!lhii's response to the neutral experience. Again the source of this 
argument is the Slll]lyutta Nikiiya, for it reads: 'Eradicate the latent tendency 
of ignorance using neither pleasant nor unpleasant sensations' (SN 2.4.24).1 
Unlike the more obvious characteristics of the pleasant and the 
unpleasant bodily experience, neutral experience is subtler. and therefore 
indifference is the typical reaction 10 this experience. Indiffurence might not 
stir up destructive emotions to the extent the pleasant and the unpleasant 
experiences do, but it is nevertheless causally produced by the power of 
ignorance, deluded mind - the lack of pa.iiiia, insightful awareness of the true 
nature of neutral sensation/feeling. Since ignorance is either actively reifying 
cognitive process or fixated upon the reified objects, it obscures the mind 
from realising the correct nature pertaining to neutral sensations/feelings and 
negati vely conditions the mind to feed upon the distorted tendency of taJ,lhii 
of ignorance towards neither pleasant nor unpleasant sensation. Breaking 
this conditioned habit by way of cultivating the awareness of the true 
characteristics pertaining to the neutral sensations/feeling, and thus 
eradicating the ignorance is therefore the primary task of the vipassanii in the 
third approach. 
Comparati vely stated, neutral experience is subtler than the pleasant 
and unpleasant bodily sensations. That is, neutral experience is more 
difficult to be felt or sensed both bodily and mentally. For this same reason 
1. "Bdukkhamasukhaya vedaniiya .vijjinuS8YO 1f1luseary, Ii (MN 1.465). 
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ignorance is more difficult to eliminate since its object is less obvious. 
Employing the neutral sensation as a pathway to eradicate tllphii of 
ignorance requires the mind to be ever more single-pointed, vigilant and 
observant. The danger of the mind losing its objective clarity and a balanced 
gaze is that this could stir up more turbulent emotions and thoughts on the 
surface of the mind, thereby overshadowing the neutral sensations. An 
insightful awareness of vipassanii realises the true nature of the neutral 
experience as transient. essentially coreless. As a result deluded, indifferent 
attitude towards the neutral sensation no long persists. To be sure, neutral 
experience persists, but once the insightful awareness of patIna replaces 
taphii of ignorance, the latter ceases to be operative. 
Briefly stated: because of the subtler nature of taphii involved, the 
operation of the third approach, the approach itself is thus subtler than the 
two previous techniques - namely, freedom from til{lhii of craving for the 
pleasantness by appropriating the pleasant experience as a vehicle, and 
freedom from the tilflhii of aversion for unpleasantness through the medium 
of the unpleasant experience. All three premises are complementary since 
they are drawn upon the three approaches by which the addictive 
conditioning of taphii is eradicated. So the implication of each premise needs 
to be understood in the light of the other two. This follows because the three 
ways in which vedanii is appropriated to eliminate the habitual conditioning 
of taphii, with all three functioning in a complementary manner, supporting 
each other. and operating interdependently of one another. Weakening taphii 
of aversion towards the unpleasant experience, vipassanii indirectly 
undermines til{lhii's fixation through craving and clinging towards the 
pleasant sensation and, so also, the indifference towards the neutral 
sensations. Also by weakening the til{lhii's addictive nature of craving and 
clinging, ta!lhii's conditioned habit of aversion and ignorance is also 
und.ermined. That said, the initial weakening and the eventual elimination of 
the conditioned habit of tIlfIhii to react to the experience is a very delicate and 
difficult task. To set the mind totally free from the conditioned habit of tanhii 
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the SaIJlyutta Nikiiya (SN 2.4.257)1 proposes a sustained practice of 
sampajaiiiia - mindful and objective response with the eye of panna, 
insightful awareness which realises the true characteristics constituting the 
entire field of vedanii. 
6. The Epistemological Argument of Sampsjai1i1a ('thorough 
understanding') and Veda.ni (Experience) 
This takes us to the sixth major argument which states: that the mind 
experiences the true freedom of release from the conditionings of Ut.!Jhii only 
when sampajaiiiill fully establishes the entire field of vedanii, the domain of 
experience, as coreless, empty. transient, perishable, conditioned and 
dependently co-arisen, such that the very fabric of tIl{Ihii is destroyed and is 
made inoperative. This follows because samplljaiiiia attacks the very basis 
upon which tIl{Ihii clings, and given vedana is that to which til[lhii is fixated 
upon, sampajafliia critically and deconstructively engages with vedanii 
penetratingly and piercingly such thaI vedanii no longer appears to be 
intrinsic. On the critical investigative approach of sampajaflfla, vedanii is 
established as neither inherently pleasant, nor inherently unpleasant nor 
inherently neither nor inherently both, rather the entire field of e)(perience is 
established as empty of any intrinsic property of its own, and therefore 
careless, transient, perishable, conditioned and dependently arisen. Once the 
awareness of the reality of vedanii is established, lil[lha's conditioned habit 
of reacting with craving, aversion, and indifference becomes inoperative. 
The content of this argument is not entirely new. All the previous 
arguments and the follow up discussions touch upon the substance of this 
argument. While this argument specifically attributes a critical investigative 
awareness as the property of sampajaiiiia, the discussion hitherto treats this 
critical cognitive skill as a generic quality attributed to paiiiiii, insightful 
awareness, and of vipassanii. What it means in essence is this: vipassanii is 
I. 	 Tissa imii. bhikkhave. vedanii BJliccii sarlkh.,a pa/iccasamuppannii kbay.-dhammii 
"aya-dhammii viriiga-dhammii nirodha-dhammii . 
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paiiiia, and pafilia is sampajanlia, and sampajaiilia is a thorough 
understanding with critical, investigative, holistic, immediate, and multi­
dimensional knowledge of how things really are, in the current context 
within the field of experience. They can also be defmed in the reverse order: 
sampajafliia is panna, and paiiiia is vipassana. This defmition is tenable on 
the ground that all these terms are equivalent and mutually coextensive - all 
engage with their objects critically, investigatively, holistically and with 
thorough vision of what they are. 
Etymologically, the term sampajafliia has the prefix sam, meaning 
'thoroughly' or 'fully' or 'totality', followed by pa, meaning 'correctly' and 
then jaiiiia, • knowing with wisdom' or 'thorough understanding' - hence, 
sam + pa + janlia, 'knowing correctly with wisdom" 'knowing in 
totality/fullness with a thorough understanding'. The etymological sense of 
the term sampajalilia is confirmed through the definition of the word 
provided in the DhammasangB{li: 
What is sampajaiina? That which is wisdom, understanding, 
analysis, depth analysis, truth-analysis, discernment, discrimination, 
differentiation, erudition, proficiency, skill, examination, 
consideration, close examination, breath, sagacity, guidance, insight, 
thorough understanding of impermanence, ... right view - this is 
called sampajaiiiia (Dhammasarig8.{li,1359; see Vibhariga, 360; and 
PuggaIapafliiatti, 80).1 
The same text, in brief, says 'insightful awareness itself is samapajafliia' 
(sampajaiiiiarp Ii pafliiii). Glossing over the definition the Digha Nlkiya Tiki 
states: 'one who understands the totality clearly with wisdom from all 
angles, or one who knows distinctly, has sampajafliia' (DNT 2.373)? 
1. 	 Sampajano Ii raltha ka!llmarp sampajailiJarp? Yii pailiJii pajiinmii vicaya pav/cayo 
dhamm.vicayo sallalakkhll{lii upJakkhll{lii paccupaJaJckhll{lii pll{ldiccarp kossJ/1iI!' 
nepuiiiiliI!' veMabyii cimii upaparikkhii bhilrf medhii pari"iyiki vipassani 
sampajaiiiiliI!' •.. sammj£lj;rrhi-ldMp wcc.1i sampajaiiiia. 
2. 	 Sam.maro paltiirehi pakar!h1iI!' vii s.visesa!!' jiniti Ii sampajano. 
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Confinning the above characterisations of sampajaiiiia and arguing 
that definition is intimately cOlmecled to the awareness of vedanii. in the 
SHIJlyurta Nikiiya, the Buddha explains sampajaiiiia in the following tenns: 
And how, 0 monks, does a monk understand thoroughly 
(sampajino hodf! Here, monks, a monk knows sensations arising in 
him. knows their persisting. and knows their passing away; knows 
each initial application of the mind on an object arising in him, 
knows it persisting and knows its passing away; knows the 
perceptions in him. knows their persisting and knows their passing 
away. This, monks. is how a monk understands thoroughly. A 
monk should abide mindfully and composed. This is our instruction 
to you (SN 3.5.401).1 
The tenn sampajaiiiia therefore comes to mean an experiential awareness of 
the impennanent, nonself. and empty nature of the vedanii. In the same vein, 
the commentaries such as the Dhammsaliga!li AHhkathii explains: 
'sampajaiiiia as wisdom which knows impennanence [dukkha and anart§) in 
a right way' (16).2 In other words sampajaiiiia is established mindfully 
engaging with the vedanii, for it is a thorough awareness of the evanescent 
nature of the vedanii on the experiential level. So, it is the wisdom of 
sampajaiiiia that enables the vipassana to become fully aware of the transient 
nature of vedanii at the level of experience. As the experiential awareness of 
the samapajaiiiia progressively becomes piercing and penetrating, the 
subtlest underlying realities of vedanii and the contents of vedanii become 
thoroughly visible to its awareness, from many different angles. 
Consequently samapajaiiiia eliminates the conditioned and addictive habit of 
t.a{lhii's reaction against the bodily or mental experience with the fixation of 
either craving or aversion or indifference. 
I. 	 KBttailca bhikkhave, bhikkhu slimpajiino hod? Idh•• bbikkhave, bhikkhullo viditii 
vedanii uppajjanri, vidilii upa!!hahanll, vidili Bbbb.tthSIp gacchanli. Yiditi virakkii 
uppajjlJJlti, Yidilii upat[hllJlti, viditii abbbarrhSIp gaccbanti, VJdi/ii saMa uppajjanti, vidiLi 
upa!fhahanri, viditii abbbanhSIp gBcchBllti. EvSIp tho, bhikkhave, bhikkhu, sampajiillo 
hori. SaID, bhikkhave. bhikkhu vihllR!yya sampajiino. AySIp vo ambiiJcSIp anu.isilJli'u 
2. 	 Sl/I'Il1flii pakiirehi anicciit:5ni jiiniiu Ii $BTrJpajaii.iiJJfp 
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Four arguments verify the claim: fust, that the penetrating vision of 
samapajailiia deconstructs the entire personality structure into what is 
traditionally known as the 'five aggregates' (paficakkhandha: the aggregate 
of form, of sensations, of volitional formations. of perceptions and of 
consciousnesses) within oneself, It therefore establishes the wisdom 
realising a composed and interdependent nature of what is 'I' and 'mine' 
which directly counleracts the ta{lhii's addictive fixation on a reified self, the 
assumption of the existence of a unified and autonomous self and the 
experience a~ociated with it; second, that the penetrating vision of 
samapajafiiia establishes each of the five aggregates, hence, one's whole 
being or personality structure, as constituted merely by the combusling and 
the vibrating phenomenal processes (sabro loko pakampito) governed by 
the law of anicca - the ever transient matrix of the physical and mental 
phenomena - thus directly combating the tl/{lhii's addictive fixation onto a 
reified and erroneous notion of the temporally enduring personal self and 
the experiences associated with it; third, that the penetrating vision of 
samapajafiiia establishes one's whole being/existence as marked by anatta ­
'not-I', 'not-me', 'not-mine', 'not-my self, 'not-self' - hence sufiiia, empty 
of any core-essence, empty of any substance, empty of any abiding spirit; 
thus directly combating the conditioned habit of taphii fixation onto an 
ontologically reified self as the core essence of person and the experience 
associated with such beliefs; and finally, that the penetrating vision of 
sampajafiiia combats the lll(lhii's conditioned habits of feeding into the 
pleasant, the unpleasant and neutral vedaniis by reacting to them respectively 
with craving, aversion and indifference thereby multiplying the suffering. 
This follows on the ground that sampajaiiiia dismantles the entire 
personality structure, of which experience forms a part and it is the 
experience upon which ta.I,lhii is fixated; thus the penetrating vision of 
sampajafiiia directly eradicates craving, aversion and ignorance. 
The implication of the arguments is this: Wisdom of sampajafiiia is 
the cognitive process which puts an end to tll{lhii of addictive habit, of 
relishing and yearning for the pleasant experience, of disliking and being 
90 1ft: XLIll 
repelled by the unpleasant experience, and of ignoring and being indifferent 
to the neutral experience. This process of deep psychological and emotional 
transfonnation however, it is argued, naturally occurs when the mind stops 
feeding on the addictive nature of tB{lha at the level of bodily sensation. And 
it is only through the holistic wisdom of sampajaiiiia, that mind is actually 
set free from the addictive nature of tJi!lhii.. It therefore makes logical sense 
to argue that without the cultivation of sampajaiiiia. wisdom arisen from the 
insightful experiential level, an ultimate way out from the addictive fixation 
of til{lhii is simply not possible given that any addictive mental habit must 
ultimately be addressed at the level of vedanii. This must follow because the 
fermentation of the fixation of craving, aversion and ignorance occurs at the 
level of bodily /emotional/psychological experience. 
But the question still remains. How does the vipassanii 
methodologically or practically establish a sampajaiiiia, while operating 
directly within the framework of one's vedana, namely with the domain of 
one's direct experience, appropriating vedanii itself to awaken the full 
awareness of ssmpajaiiiia in order to eradicate the conditioned reactive babit 
of t3{lhii? The answer lies in understanding the methodological argument 
related to the satipa!!hinas. the foundations of mindfulness. 
7. The Methodological Argument of Slitipa!#Iiaa (Foundations 
of Mindfulness) 
The argument reads as follows: that the satipaf~ina (foundation of 
mindfulness/awareness) methodologically establishes the practice of 
vipassanii to operate entirely within the domain of one's direct experience 
since the satipaf.chiina practice appropriates vedanii - bodily and 
emotional/psychological experiences - to awakening the full awareness of 
ssmpajaiiila - wisdom which eradicates the conditioned reactive habit of 
til{lhii. This argument is supported by four premises. First. that the wisdom 
of ssmpajailila established through the mindfulness of one's body (tiiya· 
anupassanii-satipa~~ina) eradicates the tm;lhii's conditioned fixation on 
one.' s bodily activities on the ground that the awareness of the body is 
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established within the scope of bodily activities (such as awareness of the 
incoming or the outgoing breath). Second, that the wisdom of sampajaiiiia 
established through the mindfulness of bodily vedanii (vedanii-anupassanii­
satipa{thiina) eliminates the taI}ha's conditioned habit of reacting against the 
pleasant, the unpleasant and the neutral experiences arising on one's body 
on the ground that the awareness of vedanii of the bodily experience is 
established within the scope/framework of bodily experience. Third, that the 
wisdom of sampajaiiiia established through the awareness of consciousness 
(citta-anupassanii-satipa![hiina) eliminates the tll1Jhii's conditioned habit of 
reacting against the wholesome/unwholesome/neutral states of 
consciousness on the ground that this awareness is established/founded 
within the framework of one's consciousness. And finally, that the wisdom 
of sampajaiiiia established through the awareness of mental contents 
(dharma-anupassanii-vipassanii), namely, that which arises in the menial 
consciousness, eliminates the taJilhii's conditioned habit of 
emotionally/psychologically reacting against the pleasant experience 
associated with the arising of the wholesome mental states (of love, good­
will. benevolence, generosity etc.). the unpleasant experience associated 
with the arising of the unwholesome mental states (of greed, hate, anger, 
jealousy, ill-will etc.) and the indifferent attitudes towards the arising of the 
neutral emotional and psychological states on the ground that this awareness 
is established/founded within the framework of menta] contents. 
These premises are drawn from the Mahiisatipa!fhiina-sutta (ON 22), 
the lext used as the manual of vipassanii practice in the Theraviidin 
traditions, in which the Buddha suggest the c8tu1l-satipa!fhiinas as the means 
to cultivating the vipassanii. Etymologically sati means 'mindfulness/ 
awareness' pat[hiina means 'foundation/establish'. Satiparpxiinll is therefore 
defined either as 'the foundationlbasis of mindfulness/awareness' or as 
'firmly establishing the mindfulness/awareness' ,I The argument which 
concerns the defll1itive ways in which the methodological aspect of the 
vipassanii works is however presented more concisely in the 
I. Mus",!, ri!!hatili pa.flhan",!,; sali eva pa!!/>anarp satipa!!/>an",!,. 
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MahiiparinibbiiIla-sutta (DN 16). The sutra explicitly stresses the points that 
the practice of vipassl.lllii constitutes the mindfully and ardently observing 
body in the body, experience (sensation/feeling) in rhe experience 
(sensation/feeling), mind/consciousness in !he mind/consciousness and 
mental objects in the mental objects (DN 16). 
Let us briefly explore the implications of each of the clauses used in 
the Mahiiparinibbiina-sutta. First. to argue that mindfulness of the body 
requires establishing the awareness of body within !he body is to claim that 
the body in question, the object of awareness, is not another's person body, 
rather it is the body of the individual practitioner of the vipassanii. This 
follows on the ground that while it is possible to establish the awareness of 
one's own body within the framework of one's own body based on a direct 
experience of the body at the level of vedl.lllii, this is however not the case 
with the body of someone else. Another person's body, since awareness is 
always mediated by language and thought, can only be apprehended through 
conceptual means, and therefore cannot be based on direct awareness. 
Hence someone else's body cannot be another person's object for 
cultivating the mindfulness of the body. Second. to argue that mindfulness 
of experience (sensation/feeling) requires establishing the awareness of 
experience within the experience is to argue that the awareness of the arising 
and the passing away of the bodily experience and of mental feeling should 
be established within one's own bodily and mental experience. This follows 
on the ground that the experience belonging to person x cannot be the object 
of a direct awareness of the experience of a person y. While the 
establishment of a direct awareness of the experience within the experience 
entails directly experiencing the flow of bodily and mental experience, such 
direct experience would not be possible in the case of another person's 
experience. Therefore the experience in question must not be an experience 
belonging to someone else. Similar is the case with the third and the fourth 
foundations of mindfulness. The mind in question in the case of the 
mindfulness of the mind is also restricted to the mindfulness of the 
practitioner's own mind as it requires the establishment of the awareness of 
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the mind within the framework. of the mind by way of directly experiencing 
it Finally the mental object in question in the case of mindfulness of mental 
objects is also restricted to one's own mental states as mindfulness of 
mental objects requires the establishment of awareness within the mental 
objects by way of directly experiencing them. And it is bard to conceive if 
such a direct awareness is possible with respect to another person's contents 
of thoughts, for it would always be meditated by language and concepts. 
There is another argument we need to consider regarding why 
vipassanii should be practised through the medium of the four foundations 
of mindfulness in the way it is suggested in the Mahasaripa£!hiina-sutta (DN 
22) and the Mahiiparinibbiina·surta (DN 16). Vipassanii, by its very 
defInition, is to see things as they truly are, and it is to be found through the 
direct awareness of the nature of things as they really are, in contrast to 
imagininglvisualising or conceptually reifying the objects. The Rohitassa 
SUClil of the A(lguttara Nikiiya (AN 4.45) brings home the rationale behind 
(he principle of observing the truths within one's own psychophysical 
aggregates stark.1y, as they really are. 'Just within this fathom-long body, 
with its perception and intellect, I declare that there is the world, the 
origination of the world, the cessation of the world, and the path of practice 
leading to the cessation of the world' (AN 4.45). The 'world' to which the 
Buddha is referring in the sutta is none other than the five psychophysical 
aggregates, the basis of our direct experience, and the role of Yipassanii is to 
develop and harness the paiiiiii, insightful awareness of one's own 
aggregates through the four foundations of mindfulness. The sutta clarifies 
the argument of why the practice of vipassanii strictly operates within the 
confines of one's own five psychophysical aggregates, and why the four 
foundations of mindfulness operate within the ved8Jlii, personal experiential 
domain. Since the five psychophysical aggregates are the only viable basis 
for developing a direct insightful awareness of the Yipassanii, and since a 
firmly established mindfulness is the k.ey to gain the mastery and control 
over one's own ever flippant nature of the six viiiiiiiJ;!as, 'consciousnesses' 
which are always drifting tempestuously, and without this mastery, it is not 
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possible to develop a finnly established mindfulness. It follows therefore 
that without the direct awareness of the five aggregates, as the sut/a points 
out, there is simply no vipassanii. The suUa supports this position on four 
counts stating the fact that there is no vipassanii if there is no direct 
insightful awareness of the four truths. If the latter is absent then the truth of 
suffering is not realised, the truth of origin of suffering is not eradicated, the 
truth of cessation of suffering is not attained and the truth of path leading to 
cessation of suffering is not undertaken. This follows on the ground that the 
realisation of each of the four noble truths are dependent on the insightful 
awareness of the vipassanii, and the cultivation of the insightful awareness 
of the vipassanii is dependent on directly experiencing the truths pertaining 
io the five aggregates. The latter is dependent on the direct awareness of 
one's own (as opposed to another person's) five psychophysical 
aggregates, and this in turn is dependent on experiencing the vedanii, either 
physically, emotionally or psychologically. 
So whether it is mindfulness of the body, or mindfulness of the 
experience (sensations/feelings), or mindfulness of the minds/ 
consciousnesses, or mindfulness of the mental contents, it is abundantly 
clear from the arguments presented above, vedanii plays central roles in the 
cultivation of the insightful awareness of paiiiiii through the practice of 
vipassanii, and therefore that the awareness of vedanii must not be ignored at 
any stage. Both in its principles and in practice, it consistently reflects that 
vipassanii works strictly within the realm of experience, and that the practice 
would not constitute the practice of vipassanii if it does not operate within 
the confines of the experiential domain. Thus the presence of the insightful 
awareness of the vedanii is critical in every aspect of the practice of 
vipassanii, from the beginning till the end. 
Having discussed the theoretical framework of viplIssanii, what 
remains is this question, when does one implement the theory of vipassanii 
into practice? Observing the vedanii, (bodily sensations, mental and 
emotional feelings) within the framework of one's body and mind, is not an 
easy task, given the extrovert nature of the mind. Suffice it to say however 
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that the mind, being too imaginative, speculative and reactive, restless and 
agitated, is mostly unaware of things as they really are. Habitually seeking 
satisfaction or gratification of some kind from one stream of thought to 
another, from one set of ideas to another, from one memory to another, the 
mind constantly moves from the past to the furore, back and forth, to and 
fro. The problem however is, as Krishnamurti points out, 'the real is near, 
you do not have to seek it; and man who seeks truth will never find it. Truth 
is in what is-and that is the beauty of it' (1954: 24). So the implementation 
of the theory of vipassanii into practice requires the mind to live here and 
now in the eternal present-it needs to stop seeking in the past or the furore. 
In the Theraniima SUlla the Buddha delivers this insightful instruction: 'Do 
not pursue the past. Do not lost yourself in the future. The past no longer is. 
The furore has not yet come. Looking deeply at life as it is in the very here 
and now, the practitioner dwells in stability and peace' (SN 21 :20). Being in 
the present is, as Thick Nhat Hanh reminds us 'the only moment we can 
touch life' (1988:40). Often-cited, the Buddha's instruction to the elderly 
Miiluilkyaputta also resonates the stress on the mindfulness of the present: 
•MaIunkyaputta, regarding things seen, heard, sensed, and cognised by you: 
in the seen there will be merely the seen; in the heard there will be merely 
the heard; in the sensed there will be merely the sensed; in the cognised 
there will be merely the cognised' (SN 35:95). According to the Buddha, to 
enjoy the life is to take care of the present and live it fully, both physically 
and mentally. By taking care of the present, both the future and the past are 
taken care of. The future becomes the present, the present becomes the past. 
Fully living the present is itself living the past and the future meaningfully. 
Free from the woes and agonies of the past and the fears and anxieties of the 
future, the life lived in the present is safe and secure, calm and quiet, and 
thus a happy and meaningful life. 
Conclusion 
Having considered the arguments advanced outlining the theoretical 
principles of vipassanii meditation. we are now in a much better position to 
draw some conclusions. First, from the etymological and epistemological 
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arguments of paiiiiii ('insightful awareness') what is demonstrated is the 
identity of vipas5IIDii 'insightful awareness' and the bhiivanii-mayii patinii 
'lived awareness' as.both centre on the awareness of the truth as it is. The 
phenomenological argument of vedanii 'experience', reveals an undeniable 
interconnection between the direct insightful awareness of ~ ipasSllIlii, on the 
one hand, and vedanii, on the other. This is on the ground that the former is 
only feasible through the medium of the latter, since it is not possible to 
cultivate a direct insightful awareness without the experience of vedanii, 
bodily/menIally/emotionally, as a vehicle. The crucial corroboration for the 
argument comes from the Buddha's famous injunction addressing a mutual 
inter-relationship between the mpa 'matter' and the niima 'mind' where the 
sensation/feeling is understood as the locus and the instrument through 
which the direct insightful awareness of the vipasslIDii is said to emerge. 
While vedaniiprovides the basis for the arising of an insightful awareness, 
as the latter depends on the direct awareness of the former, what can be 
conduded is, vedanii is not in itself constitutive of insight or wisdom on the 
ground that mere experience does not imply an insightful awareness, 
therefore, it does entail the wisdom of vipassanii. The psychological 
argument of 'taphii 'craving' reinforces the thesis that the experience of 
vedanii is not only a basis for the arising of insightful awareness, it equally 
provides a basis for the arising of avijjii 'ignorance', 'confusion' - the very 
antithesis of awareness, consequently the basis for the arising of latJhii'Ii 
psychological and emotional fixation through craving, aversion, and 
indifference - since these are the causal conditions for the arising of 
suffering, the same vedanii is therefore a basis for the arising of the chain of 
suffering and stress. Another imponant implication of this argument is as 
follows: while the other systems maintain the sensory objects as the basis 
for the arising of craving, the vipassana-tradition sees the experience of 
vedanii arising as a result of the contact of the senses with their respective 
objects as the basis for the arising of craving. While the other systems 
maintain the renunciation of the attachment to the sensory objects as a 
pathway to the freedom fTOm the fixation of tll!1hii, and therefore from the 
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suffering, vipassana tradition, on the other hand. argues that it is the 
renunciation of the attachment to vedanii of the physical sensation or 
emotional feelings as a pathway to the freedom from the fixation of r~ii, 
and therefore from the suffering since the latter is conditioned by the former. 
From this argument what follows is that the addictiveness or fixation of 
tsphii is at the root of human problems on the ground that laphii's 
addictiveness of craving. aversion and indifference is deeply seeded in the 
experience of vedanii. Therefore, it follows, the root of human suffering 
cannot be addressed fully without eliminating the addictive nature of taphii at 
the level of vedana, experience. 
But how does vipassanii address this problem? It is argued that the 
answer to this question lies in the understanding of the inner workings of 
the insightful awareness of the vipassanii meditation. To be more precise, 
one has to understand the way in which vipassanii shakes off the craving for 
the pleasant, aversion for the unpleasant, and indifference for the neutral 
bodily/mental/emotional experiences. The next three inter related arguments 
explain the ways in which the insightful awareness of vipassanii dissolves 
the addictiveness of taphii at the experiential level on the ground that the 
entire process of freedom from the conditioning of l~ii hinges on the 
awareness of the vedanii, bodily/mental/emotional sensations or feelings. 
The soteriological argument of vedanii and taphii has shown three 
pathways in which vipassanii eradicates the conditionings, fixations and 
addictiveness of t~ii by employing the vedanii, sensation/feeling as an 
instrumental device. It has shown the following: first, the unpleasant 
experience is employed as a means to eradicate the addictiveness of aversion 
towards the unpleasant sensation/feelings; second, th~ pleasant experience is 
employed as a means to eradicate the addictiveness of craving and clinging 
towards the pleasant experience. and finally, the neutral experience is 
employed as a vehicle to eradicate the addictiveness of ignorance and 
indifference towards the neutral experience. So this argument is adduced by 
three premises corresponding to three approaches based on employing the 
vedanii as pathways to eradicating laphii in the vipassanii practice such that 
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these three pathways corresponds to three addictive expressions of tlL!lhii ­
craving, aversion and ignorance. 
The epistemological argument based on the role of sampajaiiiiiia has 
shown further the significance of the experience of vedanii. It does this in 
two ways: first it has shown that vedanii is that which enables the 
sampajaiiiiiia to reatise the experience of sensation/feeling (be it pleasant, 
unpleasant or neutral) as an inherently transient, evanescent, empty and 
coreless process. Second, it is has shown, that through the cultivation of 
sampajaiiiia, realising the nature of experience, that dispels the continued 
operation of taphii's addictive nature of relishing, yeaming, reaching-out for 
the pleasant experience, tli{lhii's addictive nature of disliking, hating, 
repelling the unpleasant experience, and tli{lhii's addictive nature of ignoring 
the neutral experience. Therefore, it follows, the freedom from the addictive 
fixation of tIi{Ihii, the key to unlocking the door to the ultimate release, is 
again, based on the direct insightful awareness of the experience of vedanii. 
The Illethodological argument based on the 'application of the 
foundation of mindfulness' (catupsscipan:hiina) addressed the practical 
concerns of grounding the vipassanii deeper within the experiential domain 
by way of advancing the four arguments, each formulated corresponding to 
the role of each of the 'four foundations of mindfulness'. The argument on 
the 'mindfulness of body' (kiiya-anupassanii-satipaffhiina) has shown that it 
needs to be cultivated within the framework: of the body itself based on a 
direct awareness of the bodily activities. The argument on the 'mindfulness 
of sensation' (vedanii-anupassanii-satips{fhiina) has shown that it has to be 
cultivated within the limits of the bodily experiences, based on the direct 
awareness of the realities pertaining to the bodily sensations themselves. So 
too, the argument of the 'mindfulness of mind' (citta-anupassanii­
sacipaUhiina) has shown that it has to be cultivated within the mind itself, 
based on the direct awareness of the realities pertaining to the mind. 
Similarly, the argument of the 'mindfulness of mental contents' (dhamma· 
aoupassanii-vipllsslloii) has shown that it has to be cultivated within the 
mental contents, based on the direct awareness of the realities pertaining to 
99 Philosophy of Vipassana Meditation 
the contents of mind such as thoughts or emotions. In all four foundations 
of mindfulness, the awareness must be firmly established either within the 
body, or experience or consciousness or contents of thoughts. This goes to 
show that in all four methods of cultivating the mindfulness of vipassanii, 
the application and the experience of vedanii is equally vital. Without the 
experience of either the bodily vedanii or the mental/emotional vedanii, as 
indicated earlier. it is not possible to anchor the direct insightful awareness 
on the phenomenological facts of the body, the experience. the mind and the 
mental contents. 
So what is shown through these seven arguments is this: vipasslIIlii 
meditation is not what most of us think it is. It is not an escapist route, for it 
is not a psychological or cognitive withdrawal from the reality of life. Nor is 
it a mystical practice, for nothing mystical is present in its principles and 
practice to justify the mysticism so-called. If vipassanii is anything at all. it is 
a sustained awareness that anchors one's mental life fmnly in the grip of the 
truths of the present moment within oneself while fully and actively 
participating in the world, both physically and mentally. That is the only 
vipassanii way. 
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